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Abstract 
         War often necessitates or compels the dehumanization of the enemy. Taking away 
the humanity of a group of people makes them easier to kill and commit atrocities against 
them while relieving the soldiers, as well as the public at large, of having to deal with any 
moral dilemmas related to their actions. Additionally, once a people have been 
dehumanized, it is a difficult task to change those attitudes, particularly when it causes 
one to examine their own role in civilian causualties, war crimes, and other abuses. While 
it is not a new phenomena for servicemen and women to return from war and join a social 
movement dedicated to educating the public and politicians about the human costs of 
war, we have chosen to focus on just one such organization: Iraq Veterans Against the 
War (IVAW). Examining IVAW narratives is especially useful to the literature on 
dehumanization and rehumanization as the veterans were not only witnesses to the Iraq 
War, but also actors within the war. Their narratives include insights into the 
dehumanization process and rehumanization process that are not found in the narratives 
of other antiwar activists. This research was done by collecting and analyzing testimonies 
given by members of IVAW during their Winter Soldier event. Through this method we 
found that members of IVAW used narratives to rehumanize enemy civilians and soldiers 
in an effort to decrease public approval of war. Members used several methods to 
rehumanize the Iraqi people and decrease apathy among Americans concerning the War 
in Iraq: they asked their audience to take the perspective of Iraqis, employed role 
reversals, emphasized the social roles and family ties of civilians, and highlighted the 
effects of war on children. 
 
Keywords 
Dehumanization, Rehumanization, War Crimes, Antiwar Movement, 
Veterans  
 
        Previous literature states that dehumanization is an important 
condition for violence and that the dehumanization of enemy civilians 
and soldiers is often necessary not only for soldiers to take part in the 
violent acts that constitute war, but also to gain public approval of war. 
How does a social movement organization make a public sympathetic to 
a group that has largely been dehumanized? After collecting and 
analyzing testimonies given by members of Iraq Veterans Against the 
War (IVAW) during their Winter Soldier event—which can be found on 
YouTube, the IVAW website and in IVAW’s book Winter Soldier Iraq 
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and Afghanistan: Eyewitness Accounts of the Occupations—we found 
that members of IVAW used narratives to rehumanize enemy civilians 
and soldiers in an effort to decrease public approval of war. Members 
used several methods to rehumanize the Iraqi people and decrease apathy 
among Americans concerning the War in Iraq: they asked their audience 
to take the perspective of Iraqis, employed role reversals, emphasized the 
social roles and family ties of civilians, and highlighted the effects of war 
on children. This work contributes to and expands the literature on 
veterans’ resistance and protest movements as well as the literature on 
the dehumanization of enemy civilians and soldiers during war by 
demonstrating how various strategies of discourse may be used in an 
attempt to reverse the effects of dehumanization and decrease support for 
war. Furthermore, this research is significant in that it may contain clues 
for effectively rehumanizing groups that have been previously 
dehumanized, which could possibly lead to strategies to reduce mass 
violence and decrease public approval for war. 
 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF VETERANS’ RESISTANCE AND PROTEST 
MOVEMENTS  
        While American veterans of war have been successful in 
exercising influence over the nation's political process (Ortiz 2004; 
McFadden 2008), their ability to alter the public’s perception of war and 
build an opposition to military combat interventions remains a marginal 
and difficult task. In this section, we briefly trace the history of veteran’s 
resistance and protest movements from the American Civil War through 
the most current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here, the goal is to 
provide a review of the underpinnings of veterans’ resistance movements 
and anti-war activities—all leading to an examination of recent efforts by 
veterans to rehumanize enemy civilians and soldiers in an effort to 
decrease public approval of war. 
        Albeit in different forms, veteran resistance has maintained a 
constant presence throughout American history. For example, following 
the American Civil War, military veterans organized the nation's first 
veterans’ organization, the Grand Army of the Republic, in order to elect 
candidates to public office who would secure and maintain pensions for 
former service members (Montgomery 2007). Similarly, following 
World War I, veterans’ organizations, such as the American Legion, 
lobbied for additional compensation for service members. These 
organizations initially secured a discharge bonus as well as the promise 
of an additional payment due to each veteran in 1945 or to the next of kin 
at the time of the veteran's death. However, faced with the hardship of 
the Great Depression, organized groups of veterans secured (but not 
without significant toil and hardship) the early payment of this bonus in 
1936 (for a detailed history of this bloody and lengthy protest movement, 
read: Ortiz 2004). During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, 
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veterans’ groups (most notably, the American Legion, the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, the Disabled American Veterans, and the American 
Veterans, or “AMVETS”) acquired considerable political power and 
social influence. Indeed, the greatest advance for veterans’ benefits came 
as a result of the political action of veterans after World War II in the call 
for and passages of various bills (most notably the GI Bill of Rights) 
which included provisions for education, home and farm loans, business 
loans, and benefits for those disabled and/or in need of pensions 
(Camacho and Sutton 2007). 
        Though veterans’ organizations have historically been more-or-
less successful in arranging protest and bringing political pressure to 
secure veterans benefits, an alternative form of systematized veteran 
resistance (namely organized anti-war activities) did not largely appear 
until the Vietnam era. Propelled principally by veterans who had been 
participants in the Vietnam conflict, this period of protest had the 
primary goals of eroding support for the Vietnam War and bringing the 
conflict to an end (Hunt 1999; Nicosia 2004; Cortright 2005). One of the 
most influential and controversial veterans’ protest collectives was the 
Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). It was originally formed 
by six Vietnam veterans and increased to a thousand members. Formed 
in 1967 by the more radical and conscientious critics of the war, these 
veterans were motivated by personal experiences “exacerbated by the 
particular characteristics of the war in Vietnam, e.g., a neocolonial and 
racist intervention…which ultimately came to define as the enemy all of 
the Vietnamese people…” (Lyons 1998: 196). 
 The VVAW wanted to bring their experiences and anti-war 
messages to the broader public and did so through demonstrations of 
antiwar sentiment. Of these protest actions, perhaps the most profound 
and penetrating were the series of testimonies known as the Winter 
Soldier Investigation. In 1971, members of the VVAW, including John 
Kerry1, organized an event in a ballroom of a Detroit motel, where more 
than one hundred veterans—mostly honorably discharged soldiers—
testified about atrocities they committed or witnessed in Vietnam 
(Stacewicz 1997). The event was held in reaction to the military's 
investigation into the My Lai massacre of 1968 (see Kelman and 
Hamilton 1989 for a detailed account of this history) and its subsequent 
conclusion that it was a "unique and isolated incident" (Wilson 2007). 
The Winter Soldier testimonies implied instead that such actions were 
routine and a part of military institutional policy. In this forum, veterans 
recalled instances of murder and sexual assault against the Vietnamese 
people as well as tales of destruction of homes, crops and livestock. But 
common in these narratives is again, the perception that the war was 
embedded in Orientalist and racist ideologies and was being waged 
against, not just the enemy, but also broadly against the Vietnamese 
people. Their testimonies were a way to highlight the atrocities and to 
3
Decker and Paul: The Real Terrorist was Me: An Analysis of Narratives Told by Iraq
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2013
S. Decker and J. Paul/ Societies Without Borders 8:3 (2013) 317-343 
 
© Sociologists Without Borders/ Sociólogos Sin Fronteras, 2013 
320 
“direct attention to both the Vietnamese victims of American aggression 
and the American soldiers who found themselves tragically entrapped by 
the logic of intervention and occupation” (Lyons 1998: 196). Further, as 
we argue here, the testimonies of the soldiers were (and are) a way to 
rehumanize those unfairly labeled “enemy” and also to rehumanize the 
soldiers themselves, the perpetrators, bystanders, and beneficiaries of 
such violence. 
        The VVAW’s Winter Soldier Investigation was filmed and 
released as a documentary under the name “Winter Soldier” in 1972 
(Stacewicz 1997). Later, Senator Mark Hatfield entered a transcript of 
the Winter Soldier Investigation into the Congressional Record, and 
Senator J. William Fulbright, chair of the United States Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations discussed the transcripts at the 
Fulbright Hearings (Hunt 1999). In addition, the VVAW eventually 
released a book that included transcripts of the confessions and 
testimonies from the original Winter Soldier Event. 
 In addition to the VVAW, another antiwar veterans’ 
organization, dubbed Veterans For Peace, formed in 1986 (Ensign 2006). 
Both organizations remained active during the period between Vietnam 
and Iraq—but without the US engaging in any prolonged warring 
conflicts that resulted in a large number of dead Americans, their 
activities were limited (Ensign 2006). However, once the US became 
fully entangled in Afghanistan and Iraq, the VVAW and Veterans For 
Peace would act as the starting point for what would allow the Iraq 
Veterans Against the War (IVAW) to emerge. 
        Like its predecessors, IVAW became a significant antiwar 
movement. In March 2008, IVAW sponsored its own ‘‘Winter Soldier’’ 
hearings in which dozens of recent veterans offered accounts of the 
atrocities they personally committed or witnessed in Iraq. IVAW was 
founded in July 2004 by Michael Hoffman, Kelly Dougherty, Alex 
Ryabov, Isaiah Pallos, Diana Morrison, Tim Goodrich, and Jim Massey. 
IVAW’s main goals are the “immediate withdrawal of all occupying 
forces in Iraq,” “reparations for the human and structural damages Iraq 
has suffered, and stopping the corporate pillaging of Iraq so that their 
people can control their own lives and future,” and “full benefits, 
adequate healthcare (including mental health), and other supports for 
returning servicemen and women” (www.ivaw.org). In addition, IVAW 
has passed resolutions opposing the war in Afghanistan, the Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell policy, and the occupation of Gaza, as well as resolutions 
supporting non-violence, immigrant rights, and the prosecution of the 
Bush administration for war crimes (www.ivaw.org). 
        Here, we also claim that such actions are efforts to decrease 
public approval of war as well as apathy among the citizenry concerning 
war. While the potential effectiveness of IVAW to do this will be 
discussed later in this article, the fact that these messages are reaching 
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the public from the veterans who experienced them seems to be an 
important component. After all, the individuals calling for these actions 
and making these testimonies are the very ones that are applauded in 
airports, receive local and national press coverage as they are reunited 
with their families and are invited to Washington D.C. to be recognized 
for their bravery and service. They are referred to as heroes and role 
models. Who better then to reach the hearts and minds of Americans? 
The following section will explore the available research on efforts to 
rehumanize “enemy others” and set the stage for an analysis of 
testimonies given by Iraq Veterans Against the War. 
 
DEHUMANIZATION AND REHUMANIZATION 
        In order to understand how rehumanization can occur, the 
phenomenon of dehumanization must first be analyzed. Broadly, 
dehumanization refers to the practice of denying others the quality of 
humanness and perceiving them as less than human, which in turn leads 
to the belief that such persons do not deserve equal respect and are 
worthy of maltreatment (Oelofsen 2009). For example, European 
colonists called Native Americans savages and beasts; during the 
Holocaust, Nazis referred to Jews as parasites; in the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbs called Bosnian Muslims pseudo-humans—and it is 
this symbolic stripping away of humanness that helps facilitate cruelty 
and genocide (Smith 2011). 
        In terms of reviewing scholarship, we begin with Jahoda (1999) 
who examined the dehumanization of racial and ethnic others in popular 
culture. Through his research he found that groups are dehumanized 
when they are depicted as savages or barbarians who lack certain 
markers of civility (e.g., lacking self-restraint, moral sensibility, having 
significant appetites for violence and sex, and being capable of tolerating 
unusual amounts of pain). In addition, Kelman (1976) states that 
dehumanization involves denying a person both their identity and their 
community. Kelmen refers to having an identity as being “an individual, 
independent and distinguishable from others, capable of making choices” 
(301) and having a community as being “part of an interconnected 
network of individuals who care for each other” (301). Furthermore, 
Haslam (2006) explains that to dehumanize an individual means to either 
deny them human uniqueness—which refers to one’s civility, refinement, 
moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity; or to deny them of human 
nature—their emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive 
openness, agency, individuality, and depth (257). 
        Dehumanization is often a central feature within political 
contexts of protracted conflict such as genocide (Bar-Tal 2000; Jahoda 
1999; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Kelman 1976). Previous literature 
states that dehumanization is an important condition for violence and that 
the dehumanization or othering of enemy civilians and soldiers is often 
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necessary not only for soldiers to take part in the violent acts that 
constitute war but also for public approval of war. When individuals are 
dehumanized, they no longer evoke compassion and moral emotions and 
are subject to moral exclusion, or the belief that certain individuals are 
“outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and consideration of 
fairness apply” (Opotow 1990: 1). Anthropologists Montague and 
Matson (1983) explain that when people are reduced to objects, they 
become dispensable, making almost any atrocity justifiable. On the topic 
of dehumanization, psychologist Zimbardo (2008) states, “under such 
conditions, it becomes possible for normal, morally upright and even 
usually idealistic people to perform acts of destructive cruelty” (3). 
          Given the context of this paper, we are interested in the processes 
of dehumanization (and later techniques of rehumanization) that have 
been used to label and construct images of Iraqis and Arab and Muslim 
men and women since 9/11 and the American Invasion of Iraq. 
Following 9/11, Americans were “drawn back into the body politic,” 
becoming less critical of social institutions and more jingoistic (Carey 
2002: 87). While media coverage and social-political discussion of 
Muslims increased dramatically after 9/11, the conversational milieu 
often failed to provide a nuanced and contextual understanding of Iraq, 
Islam, and Muslims in general (Steuter and Wills 2008). Indeed, as 
Malcolm, Bairner and Curry (2010: 216) write: “Edward Said’s claim 
that ‘malicious generalizations about Islam have become the last 
acceptable form of denigration of foreign culture in the West’ (1997: xii) 
seems more pertinent now than ever.” 
        Further, Edward Said’s Orientalism (2003) provides an 
interpretative framework from which to understand this dehumanization 
and the imagined, oppositional relationship between the “‘West’ and the 
‘Rest’ and Muslims in particular” (Saeed 2007: 447). Said’s work 
explores the history of the “Us versus Them” binary in which Islamic 
and Arab cultures have been defined as deficient and antithetical to 
Western culture. In this way then, orientalism constructs cultural 
generalizations and stereotypes that depict the Orient (and its members) 
as “irrational, backward, violent, animalistic, untrustworthy and corrupt” 
(Steuter and Wills 2008). To be sure, the extent to which Arab and 
Muslims have been dehumanized and degraded in post 9/11 orientalist 
frameworks is extensive and is well documented (David and Jalbert 
1998; Steuter and Wills 2008; Smith 2011). 
        Having identified this, our task now is to examine efforts to 
rehumanize “the other” and to identify specific strategies of 
rehumanization. As several scholars have implied, such efforts of 
rehumanization (for both the other and self) are efforts “to heal the 
burdens of psychic injury” (Lyons 1998: 195) and to cleanse a spoiled 
self (Oelofsen 2009). While there is much literature on dehumanization, 
academic research on rehumanization is still sparse. Much of the current 
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work on rehumanization centers on person-centered medicine in order to 
rehumanize patients who are easily dehumanized by the healthcare 
system (Miles and Mezzich 2012; Anderson 2011; Miles and Mezzich 
2011; Miles 2009; and Marcum 2008). Halpern and Weinstein (2004) 
state that there is surprisingly little research concerning the 
rehumanization of individuals who have been dehumanized in the 
process of war or ethnic cleansing, although such work has important 
implications for the health and wellbeing of citizens and there has been 
substantial research concerning the reconstruction of infrastructure and 
the establishment of law in areas torn apart by war and ethnic cleansing. 
In addition, the research that does exist on rehumanization following war 
or ethnic cleansing tends to examine rehumanization processes between 
populations that directly interact with one another, such as Halpern and 
Weinstein’s (2004) work on rehumanizing processes, which examines 
everyday interactions between Croats and Serbs. While this research is 
immensely valuable, there is little work that examines strategies to 
rehumanize a population in the eyes of a public that will have little direct 
contact with these individuals, as the average American will not come 
into contact with Iraqi civilians. A notable exception is Bonds’ (2009) 
work, which examines the efforts of American peace activists to counter 
the dehumanization of Iraqis through role taking narratives in order to 
increase rates of activism. Specifically, Bonds interviews peace activists 
who traveled to Iraq in order to live among the civilian population and 
experience “first hand” the trauma and abuses resulting from the U.S. 
occupation. Their narratives worked to challenge the dehumanizing 
rhetoric of Iraq War promoters typically found in the mainstream media. 
Our work extends the exploration of Bonds (2009) and examines the use 
of empathy building as an anti-war movement tactic by soldiers who 
witnessed, experienced, and in some cases committed, these abuses first 
hand. We feel that examining IVAW narratives is especially useful to the 
body of scholarship on dehumanization and rehumanization, as the 
veterans were not only witnesses to the Iraq War, but also actors within 
the war. Their narratives include insights into the dehumanization 
process and rehumanization process that are not found in the narratives 
of other antiwar activists. Members of IVAW discuss their first hand 
experiences with the dehumanizing rhetoric found in the US military, 
which not only leads to the acceptance of Iraqi deaths as collateral 
damage but also encourages war crimes and other war time abuses. In 
addition, many of their narratives gave detailed accounts of the 
experiences that led them to see dehumanized Iraqi civilians as humans 
again.  
The research that does exist by rehumanization scholars has 
already identified several specific strategies. Indeed, a most common 
tactic to rehumanize “the enemy” is to emphasize our shared 
commonalties of being. For Keen (1986) and David and Jalbert (1998), 
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this most common characteristic is the family. David and Jalbert (1998: 
32-33) write: 
The category ‘family’ carries with it a sense of civic 
responsibility (i.e., part of its many logical properties). Family 
men are not conventionally the kind of men who engage in 
activities related to terrorism. On a commonsense level, this 
operates to inform readers and listeners that there should be no 
fear of people who have families because, presumably, they 
would not engage in anything which could jeopardize the well 
being of others or their family members. 
Dehumanization may also be countered by engaging others’ perspectives 
(Bonds 2009; Oelofsen 2009) and promoting empathy (Bonds 2009; 
Halpern and Weinstein 2004). Oelofson (2009) notes that using “world 
travel” in literal and symbolic ways can create an engagement with 
other’s perspectives that can lead to rehumanization, and Bonds (2009) 
demonstrates that role taking and empathy can be used to counter 
dehumanizing rhetoric. Other identified strategies of rehumanization 
involve combating stereotypes through education (Shaheen 2003) and 
emphasizing a group’s positive social contributions and law-abiding 
ways (David and Jalbert 1998); transforming “us and them” into “we” 
through the shared play and celebration of sport (Dominic, Bairner and 
Curry 2010; Eitzen 2013) and via positive presentations in art and media 
(Shaheen 2003; Wiltz 2009); and demonstrating the willingness of 
victims’ to forgive and humanize their offenders (Gobodo-Madikizela 
2002, 2008).  
In the end, we seek to contribute to previous work on 
dehumanization and rehumanization, as well as veterans’ resistance and 
protest movements, by examining how such movements can use various 
strategies of discourse to rehumanize enemy civilians and soldiers in 
order to decrease support for the war.  We will expand on previous 
scholarship that identifies perspective taking and an emphasis on the 
family as strategies in rehumanization and introduce the following new 
strategies in rehumanization: employing role reversals and highlighting 
the effects of war on children. 
METHODS AND SETTING 
       IVAW, inspired by the original Winter Soldier Investigation, 
sponsored an event entitled Winter Soldier: Iraq and Afghanistan in 
Silver Spring, Maryland—intentionally held only a short distance from 
the nation’s capital—from March 13 to 16, 2008. In an effort to create 
awareness of the consequences of the War in Iraq, the members of 
IVAW gave testimonies concerning the effects that the war has had on 
both Iraqi and Afghanistan civilians and American soldiers. The Winter 
Soldier: Iraq and Afghanistan held various sessions, which included the 
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Breakdown of the Military, Civilian Testimony, Corporate Pillaging, 
Cost of War at Home, Crisis in Veteran Healthcare, Future in GI 
Resistance, Gender and Sexuality, Legacy of GI Resistance, Racism and 
War, Response to Department of Defense, and Rules of Engagement. 
Many of the IVAW members giving testimonies had written the 
testimonies beforehand and read them aloud. Several of the speakers also 
brought photos or videos as evidence of war crimes or other forms of 
abuse that they had witnessed or taken part in while at war—many of 
which were graphic images of dead bodies. Though the eyewitness 
testimonies of the participants were not formulaic and varied 
considerably from one participant to another, they typically demonstrated 
a link between war crimes and other abuses and the functioning of the 
military and American society in general. Ultimately, these varied 
narratives attempted to rehumanize Iraqi and Afghanistan civilians and 
called for an end to the wars. Following Winter Soldier: Iraq and 
Afghanistan, other veterans around the country began organizing what 
IVAW has referred to as “mini-Winter Soldiers” in order to tell their own 
stories (IVAW and Glantz 2008). 
        In addition to posting videos of many of the testimonies on 
YouTube, the IVAW website (www.ivaw.org) contains video and audio 
archives of all testimonies made at Winter Soldier: Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In addition, most of the testimonies were transcribed and published by 
IVAW and journalist Aaron Glantz as a book titled Winter Soldier, Iraq 
and Afghanistan: Eyewitness Accounts of the Occupations. The book 
includes chapters that correspond to the various sessions held at Winter 
Soldier, as well as an introduction by Dougherty explaining how IVAW 
was formed, how Winter Soldier came about, reactions to the Winter 
Soldier event, and the importance of eye witness testimonies. 
        We examined sixty-four testimonies from Iraq Veterans Against 
the War. Forty-four of the testimonies we examined took place at Winter 
Soldier: Iraq and Afghanistan. The transcribed testimonies appearing in 
the book Winter Soldier: Iraq and Afghanistan averaged three to five 
pages in length. In addition, we also coded twenty other testimonies 
made by members of IVAW that were uploaded to YouTube. Many of 
these were recorded at mini Winter Soldiers or speaking events, in which 
members of IVAW were asked to discuss their experience at colleges or 
antiwar rallies. A few testimonies emerged from interviews with IVAW 
members conducted by independent news organizations that had been 
uploaded to YouTube. We transcribed any portions of testimonies that 
appeared on YouTube but were omitted from the book, as some 
testimonies were slightly edited.2 
To study the narratives of IVAW, we conducted a qualitative 
document analysis (Babbie 2004), guided by grounded theory (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967). After identifying the testimonies of IVAW members 
as intriguing narratives that served to make sense of the atrocities of war 
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and their effects on both soldiers and civilians, we used memoing to 
document themes that emerged while reading and viewing the 
testimonies. After seeing rehumanization themes emerge through 
memoing, we narrowed our focus and began selectively coding IVAW 
members’ testimonies for such themes. We then used additional 
memoing to identify four subthemes of rehumanization narratives: asking 
an audience to take the perspective of the other, employing role 
reversals, emphasizing the social roles and familial ties of the other, and 
highlighting the effects of war on children. 
 
PRELUDE TO THE SOLDIERS’ TESTIMONIES: DEHUMANIZING 
OF IRAQIS 
          If dehumanization or othering is necessary not only for soldiers to 
justify the violence they take part in against enemy soldiers and civilians, 
but also for citizens to support a war, how can antiwar movements 
rehumanize enemy civilians and soldiers in order to decrease support for 
a war? Members of IVAW sought first to demonstrate the prevalence and 
effects of the dehumanization of Iraqis—typically brought about by the 
military or American culture more generally—and demonstrate the need 
to rehumanize Iraqi civilians.  
 IVAW states that they hope to turn public opinion against the 
War in Iraq by describing the “degrading forces of war and occupation 
that dehumanize and destroy…human beings” (IVAW and Glantz 2008: 
3) and to “try to break their fellow citizens out of a collective apathy that 
allows the war and occupation to continue” (7). In demonstrating the 
prevalence and effects of the dehumanization of Iraqis, IVAW made the 
case that war crimes and other war time abuses were not anomalies, but 
were due to the dehumanizing rhetoric embedded within the United 
States military culture. For example, Glantz draws a link between 
dehumanization and wartime abuse: 
 
Why do these seemingly senseless killings occur? What 
makes them possible? What brings otherwise normal 
young men and women to the point of committing 
terrible atrocities? … the answer begins with the 
dehumanizing nature of military training itself (IVAW 
and Glantz 2008: 59). 
 
Additionally, within their testimonies, members of IVAW also called 
attention to the military’s use of racism to dehumanize Iraqis. As Glantz 
stated: 
 
Overt, institutionalized racism from the command also 
plays an important role in distancing soldiers and 
marines from the people they kill. This system did not 
10
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begin with the occupation of Iraq or inside the U.S. 
military. It is as old as war itself. In the 1930s, Nazi 
propaganda films depicted Jews as rodents. During the 
Rwandan genocide, ethnic Tutus referred to the Hutus 
they slaughtered as ‘insects’ or cockroaches. During the 
1960s and ‘70s, American soldiers dehumanized the 
Vietnamese people by calling them ‘gooks’. Today, 
members of the US Armed Forces regularly refer to Iraqi 
and Afghan civilians as ‘hajis’ and ‘towel-heads’ 
(IVAW and Glantz 2008: 61). 
 
Similarly, as Blake3 stated at an antiwar rally: 
 
Dehumanization is a big thing with the troops over there. 
We’re taught not to connect with the Iraqi people. We’re 
taught not to view them as human beings, that’s why it’s 
common in the military to call the Iraqi people hajis, 
similar to the Vietnam where the Vietnamese people 
were called Gooks, because they didn’t want to connect 
with them (Reece20796 2008). 
 
In addition, several of those giving testimony gave examples of 
dehumanizing discourse within the military and demonstrated that such 
practices were deeply embedded within the social institution. Prysner4 
stated the following: 
 
Then September 11 happened, and I began to hear new 
words like “towel-head,” and “camel jockey,” and the 
most disturbing, “sand nigger.” These words did not 
initially come from my fellow lower-enlisted soldiers, 
but from my superiors; my platoon sergeant, my first 
sergeant, my battalion commander. All the way up the 
chain of command, these viciously racist terms were 
suddenly acceptable (IVAW and Glantz 2008: 98). 
 
Prysner explained how dehumanizing the term haji can be, saying, 
“When I got to Iraq in 2003, I learned a new word, ‘haji.’ Haji was the 
enemy. Haji was every Iraqi. He was not a person, a father, a teacher, or 
a worker.” Another IVAW member, Casey5, made the following 
comments to a journalist at an anti-war rally: 
 
Journalist: From the outset was there much consideration 
about the Iraqi people in your mind? 
Casey: Oh no, no. I mean that came later on, definitely, 
but no, I wasn't concerned about them at all. 
11
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Journalist: Was that something for you personally, or 
was that something drilled into you by the military? 
Casey: No, I mean that's why they call them Haji. I mean 
you got to desensitize yourself from them, they're not 
people. They're animals. 
Journalist: What upset you the most about things that 
happened in Iraq? 
Casey: The total disregard for human life, I mean I 
would have to say is.... Overall, just the total disregard 
for how they jam into your head, 'this is haji, this is haji, 
you know, you totally take the human being out of it, 
and make them a video game. 
Journalist: Your superiors were doing that? Your 
commanders? 
Casey: Oh, of course. 
Journalist: Up to what level? 
Casey: I mean everybody...I mean yeah, if you start 
looking at them as humans and stuff like that, well God, 
how are you going to kill them? 
(Reece2076 2008) 
 
REHUMANIZING AFGHANIS AND IRAQIS 
 Of course describing acts of dehumanization will only reduce 
support for a war if the public sees the subjects of the dehumanization as 
humans that are worthy of humane treatment. In addition to emphasizing 
the widespread prevalence and dire effects of dehumanization, the 
members of IVAW worked to rehumanize Iraqi civilians. The narratives 
of rehumanization that IVAW members presented were often based on 
first hand experiences that changed their views of Iraqis and, as a result, 
their opinion of the war more generally. In other words, their testimonies 
were an attempt to allow the public to experience second hand the 
interactions that had led them to see Iraqis as human and ended their 
support for the Iraq War. Members of IVAW attempted to rehumanize 
Iraqis by asking their audience to take the perspective of Iraqis, 
employing role reversals, emphasizing the social roles and family ties of 
civilians, and highlighting the effects of war on children. 
 
Taking the perspective of the other 
 One of the main ways that members of IVAW attempted to 
rehumanize Iraqi civilians and soldiers was by asking audience members 
to take the perspective of these civilians and soldiers. These findings are 
similar to literature that shows that promoting symbolic world travel to 
create an engagement with others’ perspectives (Oelofsen 2009) and 
encouraging empathy (Halpen and Weinstein 2004) can lead to 
rehumanization. Bonds (2009) explains that the peace activists in his 
12
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study "provide audience members with an opportunity to practice moral 
reasoning from the imagined position of suffering others" (5) in hopes of 
increasing rates of mobilization. 
 In most instances, members of IVAW asked their audience to 
take the perspective of Iraqi civilians and soldiers by walking them 
through specific scenarios from an Iraqi’s point of view, or as Emanuel 
stated, “put ourselves in the Iraqis’ shoes who encountered these events 
every day and for the last five years” (49). Arendt6 does this in the 
following testimony, stating: 
 
There are two specific things I will address about the 
operation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. One is the issue of 
torture. I’ve heard a lot of speculation as to what torture 
is. I would like to ask everyone to consider whether 
living in a cell for five years, away from your family and 
friends, without ever being given answers as to why 
you’re there, whether this is torture. Having to ask 
nineteen-year-old boys who don’t have any idea about 
the policies of their government why they’re detained 
and the answers that we weren’t able to give—I consider 
that torture (IVAW and Glantz 2008: 83). 
 
Similarly, Goldsmith7 asks the audience to take the perspective of Iraqis 
by walking them through the following scenario: 
 
I was nineteen years old when I deployed to Iraq and I 
spent the first eight months of my deployment in the 
slums of Sadr City. It’s a place that was neglected not 
only by Saddam Hussein but is horribly neglected by 
America right now. When we went there we promised 
them freedom; we promised to get them clean water, to 
get them food, to get them jobs. Instead, there are two to 
four hours of electricity a day, randomly. Sewage leaks 
into the fresh-water system....Imagine living in a place 
where it gets up to 150 degrees. You don’t want to go 
out during the day, and at night American soldiers are 
rolling around your streets telling you that you can’t go 
outside, and you can’t talk to your friends, you can’t 
enjoy yourself. You can’t gather outside the coffeehouse 
or the chai shop because if you go out past dark you’re 
committing a crime. So essentially, during the summer 
months Sadr City was a prison. Three million people in 
Sadr City were prisoners of war (IVAW and Glantz 
2008: 186). 
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In the following example, Endicott8 walks the audience through the 
scenario of American soldiers raiding an Iraqi’s home: 
 
Try to imagine yourself tonight, as you sleep warm in 
your bed with your wife, your children in the next room, 
2:00 am your door is kicked in and men are screaming as 
they kick open your bedroom door, screaming a 
language you don’t understand, they’re pointing 
machine guns at your face as they drag you by your hair 
from your bed slamming your face down onto the 
ground, putting their boots on the back of your neck and 
smashing your face harder into the concrete floor. Your 
struggle to protect your family and your home is futile, 
as you are blindfolded and handcuffed so tight that you 
lose feeling in your hands within minutes. All you know 
is you can hear your screaming wife and children crying 
for help and you are too useless to protect them. You 
were not on a list of suspected terrorists. You were not 
on a list of known terrorists, in fact, you completely 
supported the US coming into your country and 
promising freedom and prosperity. You are simply a 
man in a house, on a street, that my platoon decided to 
search. When your blindfold is finally released, the men 
have left your home, it’s destroyed. Your wife and 
children are huddled in a corner defenseless and crying. 
Every drawer in your home is thrown, the contents 
broken, soiled, your bed has been urinated on, your 
wife’s panties are glued to the wall, maybe a family 
heirloom is missing, or other objects stolen, the floor is 
wet with fresh chewing tobacco spit, and you vainly try 
to tell your family it will be okay, and never happen 
again, but in your heart you know all the while your 
chances are, it probably will (Claiborne 2009). 
 
Role reversal 
          Members of IVAW also worked to rehumanize Iraqis by taking 
part in role reversal and portraying themselves as villains. Narratives 
create verbal representations of society and allow individuals to 
understand their place within the social order (Maynard and Whalen 
1995; Goffman 1981). Typically social movements use narratives to 
identify some individuals as victims, some as villains, and others as 
heroes (Benford and Snow 2000; Oliver and Johnston 2000; Turner 
1996). Doing so identifies dedicated members in a positive light and 
reinforces negative views of individuals that are seen as challengers to 
the movement, thereby supporting the status system of the group (Fine 
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2002). However, unlike most social movement narratives that portray 
group members as heroes, and unlike narratives in American media and 
culture which often depict US soldiers as heroes and Iraqi and Afghan 
soldiers and civilians as villainous terrorists and insurgents, members of 
IVAW often depicted themselves as villains. By changing their role from 
that of hero to that of villain, IVAW members relegated Iraqis and 
Afghans to the roles of victims or heroes. Doing so allowed members of 
IVAW to portray the Iraqis and Afghans in a positive light in hopes of 
rehumanizing them, rather than portraying them as villains who deserve 
violent treatment. 
        While some members made blanket statements identifying 
themselves as villains, like Prysner who bluntly stated, “We were told we 
were fighting terrorists; the real terrorist was me, and the real terrorism is 
this occupation” (IVAW and Glantz: 100), most of the members depicted 
themselves as villains by describing their villainous behavior. Even the 
introduction of the book highlights this behavior, stating: 
 
Over four days of gripping testimony, dozens of veterans 
spoke about killing innocent civilians, randomly seizing 
and torturing prisoners, refusing to treat injured Afghans 
and Iraqis, looting, taking ‘trophy’ photos of the dead, 
and falsifying reports to make it look as though civilians 
they killed were actually ‘insurgents’ (IVAW 2008: 6-7). 
 
For instance, Turner9 presented himself as a villain in the following 
narrative: 
 
On April 18, 2006, I had my first confirmed kill. He was 
an innocent man. I don’t know his name. I call him “the 
Fat Man.” During the incident he walked back to his 
house, and I shot him in front of his friend and father. 
The first round didn’t kill him after I’d hit him in his 
neck. Afterwards, he started screaming and looked right 
into my eyes. I looked at my friend I was on post with, 
and I said, “Well I can’t let that happen.” I took another 
shot and took him out....We were all congratulated after 
we had our first kills, and that happened to have been 
mine. My company commander personally congratulated 
me, as he did everyone else in our company. This is the 
same individual who had stated that whoever gets their 
first kill by stabbing them to death will get a four day 
pass when we return from Iraq (IVAW and Glantz: 25). 
 
Endicott also portrays himself as a villain, stating: 
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I knew my time had come. As I laughed, I ran, this was 
everything I had hoped for. My chance to kill. I didn’t 
care how or who, but someone was going to die today, 
and I was going to be a part of the gun club, which I so 
cherished. From that moment forward, our efforts 
became more intense, we began getting intelligence of 
suspected terrorist safe houses, weapons caches, we 
would gear up, pump our death metal and pump each 
other up comparing body counts, telling each other, ‘It’s 
only a matter of time before we get another.’ We knew 
every way to walk right around the rules of engagement. 
Rules of engagement—what a joke! To us, the rules of 
engagement were not rules at all, but merely words on a 
piece of paper, somewhere printed for the sole purpose 
of protecting officers if we grunts actually got caught 
(Claiborne 2009). 
 
Similarly, Casey told the following story: 
 
Oh at that time, when we first got down there you could 
basically kill anyone that you wanted, I mean it was that 
easy, you didn't even have to get off and dig a hole or 
anything like that, all you had to do was having 
something there for a picture, I mean we were driving 
down the road at 3 in the morning, there was a guy along 
the side of the road, shoot him, throw a shovel off, there 
you go (Reece2076). 
 
          In all of these cases IVAW members depicted themselves as 
villains who not only took part in violence as an unfortunate but 
necessary part of war, but who took part in unjustified violence because 
it was gratifying for them. Not only do these stories explicitly state that 
those targeted were random or innocent targets—who were at times 
merely reduced to numbers in a body count—but that such acts were 
acceptable in the military. By depicting themselves as insensitive, 
bloodthirsty villains, and portraying their victims as random bystanders, 
the members of IVAW contradict any narratives that depict Iraqis as evil 
villains, deserving of their violence, and instead reveal them as victims. 
 
Emphasizing familial roles 
          The third way that IVAW members worked to rehumanize Iraqis 
was by portraying them as family members. As stated above, family men 
may seem less threatening and therefore less likely to be villains. In 
addition, as previous literature has noted, dehumanizing others involves 
portraying them as lacking moral sensibility, emotional responsiveness, 
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and interpersonal warmth, and denying that they are part of a 
community. In contrast, notions of family often conjure up feelings of 
moral sensibility, emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, and a 
sense of community. Furthermore, it is likely that recognizing one’s role 
in a family makes it easier for others to relate to them and see them as 
human, as most individuals can relate this to their own experience of 
family bonds. Duffy10 emphasized this connection to familial roles in the 
following example: 
 
A lot of people called them hajis. To me, this detainee 
was just an old man that could’ve been somebody’s 
father, grandfather, or uncle. I remember exactly how he 
looked, and I remember exactly how he felt, dying in my 
hands (IVAW and Glantz: 87). 
 
In this example, Goldsmith contrasts the dehumanizing practice of 
bragging about killing Iraqis with the realization that an individual has a 
social role and a connection to other family members: 
 
People made videos to send home to their friends and 
family to brag. They were used to build morale, to say 
that killing is right, death is right, dead Iraqis are a great 
thing, and that’s wrong...This is somebody’s brother, this 
is somebody’s husband, this is somebody’s son, and this 
is somebody’s cousin (IVAW and Glantz: 187). 
 
Once again, in contrast to the dehumanizing practices of creating war 
trophies, familial roles are called upon to depict someone as real and as 
an emotional entity that one can relate to in order to rehumanize them. In 
another instance, Hurd11 told the following story to emphasize the 
familial roles of Iraqi citizens: 
 
We were out on a dismounted patrol one day, walking 
by a woman’s house. She was outside working in her 
garden. Our interpreter threw up his hand and said, 
“Salaam Alaikum,” which means “Peace of God be with 
you.” She said, “No. No peace of God be with you.” She 
was angry and so we stopped and our interpreter said, 
“Well, what’s the matter? Why are you so angry? We’re 
here to ensure your safety.” That woman began to tell us 
a story. Just a few months prior, her husband had been 
shot and killed by a United States convoy because he got 
too close to their convoy. He was not an insurgent. He 
was not a terrorist. He was a working man trying to 
make a living for his family. To make matters worse, a 
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Special Forces team operating in the Kindi area holed up 
in a building there and made a compound out of it. A 
few weeks after this man died, the Special Forces team 
got some intelligence that this woman was supporting 
the insurgency, so they raided her home, zip-tied her and 
her two children, threw them on the floor, and detained 
her son and took him away. For the next two weeks, this 
woman had no idea whether her son was alive, dead, or 
worse. At the end of that two weeks, the Special Forces 
team rolled up, dropped her son off, and without so 
much as an apology drove off. It turns out they had acted 
on bad intelligence. Things like that happen every day in 
Iraq. We are harassing these people. We are disrupting 
their lives (IVAW and Glantz: 39). 
 
This story not only demonstrates the way that war disrupts the family 
unit, but also demonstrates that the individuals detained and killed in the 
war are all real people with family members. Such narratives make it 
easy for others to relate to Iraqis and to see them as humans. 
 
Highlighting the effects of violence on children 
         Another tactic used by IVAW members to rehumanize Iraqis was 
to highlight the effects of war on Iraqi children.  Focusing on children 
may be effective in rehumanizing individuals in that the assumptions 
generally made about children (e.g. that they are innocent and 
vulnerable) are incompatible with characteristics attributed to those who 
are dehumanized (e.g. that they have strong appetites for violence and 
sex, are prone to criminality, and are capable of tolerating unusual 
amounts of pain). Furthermore, in American culture, as in many cultures, 
it is generally assumed that one should act in a nurturing way towards 
children and that children should be shielded from violence. Such 
assumptions about children and how they should be treated are 
incompatible with dehumanizing rhetoric that frames some individuals as 
deserving of violence or as expendable. Therefore, discourse that 
describes Iraqi children as the recipients of violence should portray the 
violence as unacceptable and Iraqis as real humans. For instance, an 
unidentified IVAW member speaking at a mini Winter Soldier event 
used the following example to highlight the effects of war on children 
and the lack of concern of the United States military for Iraqi children: 
 
One time our patrol, many a times we would swerve to 
actually try to hit people and kids, and one of our drivers 
missed and he opened his door and he hit this child with 
his door and these doors are plated with a lot of armor. 
They’re really heavy. Just to pick up the door by itself, it 
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almost takes two men to do it, just to put the door onto 
the hinge, and these doors are just really heavy, and a 
moving vehicle opening this door, swinging it out and 
hitting this kid, um, I’m sure that kid must have died. 
And I was in the truck, I was on the gun on the truck 
behind the truck that did it, and we finally pulled up the 
base where we were headed to, we were on an escort 
mission, and uh, the TC came around and was screaming 
and yelling at the kid who did it, and I was like ‘Thank 
God,’ you know, something is being done, and uh, the 
kid was left alone and he’s pissed off that he got yelled 
at, and I was asking him about it and he said that he got 
in trouble because he endangered himself and his crew 
by opening the door and there could have been a 
possible IED (Reece 2076). 
 
Similarly, Ewing12 gave the following example to emphasize war’s effect 
on children: 
 
Soon we began to bring candy in our bags and the guys 
up in the turret of the Bradleys would throw it out the 
sides of the vehicle. The kids all rushed to the sides of 
the vehicle and hung out and fought for the candy. It was 
billed as a gesture of goodwill. There was also another 
motive: If the kids were around our vehicles, the bad 
guys wouldn’t attack. We used the kids as human shields 
(IVAW and Glantz 2008: 70-71). 
 
In addition, Goldsmith related the following example of how the 
occupation in Iraq and American portrayals of Iraqis led him to endanger 
children’s lives: 
 
There was a little boy, on an alley way to my left, on top 
of a building. A little boy who hated American soldiers. 
And he was holding up a stick, as if to mock having an 
AK-47, and he was pointing it at me, pretending to 
shoot. I trained my weapon on him. I positively 
identified my target. I trained my weapon on him, and 
thought for a couple minutes, ‘I hate these Iraqis. I hate 
these kids who throw rocks and bricks at me. This is my 
chance. I can kill this kid. Just to take one out of the 
couple million of them out.’ It took me a lot of thinking 
to not pull that trigger that day. I could have killed a six-
year-old boy, I could have killed someone’s son, but I 
didn’t. But I was put in that position. I was put in that 
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position by the United States occupation of Iraq and by 
the media creating this hatred for Iraqis (IVAW and 
Glantz 2008: 188). 
 
Conclusion and Effects of Rehumanization Strategies 
The testimonies of these soldiers paint a grim picture of war, 
attesting to acts of brutality and inhumanity they witnessed or carried out. 
In telling their stories, veterans sought to bring out the cruelties and 
dehumanization embedded in the U.S. war effort. Some of these 
testimonies addressed acts of large-scale violence and human rights 
violations, while others focused on racism, xenophobia, and the systemic 
harassment of Iraqi citizens. 
 Through the medium of firsthand accounts, veterans urged the 
public to experience the concrete abuses resulting from broader foreign 
policy decisions and perpetuated by U.S. soldiers. But more than just 
telling stories, their ultimate goal was the rehumanization of persons 
victimized by the war in an effort to decrease public approval for war. 
Members of IVAW asked their audience to take the perspective of the 
other, employed role reversals, emphasized the social roles and family 
ties of civilians, and highlighted the effects of war on children, in hopes 
that a public outcry would influence government officials to end the war. 
Put another way, members of IVAW hoped that translating their first 
hand experiences of war would also lead the public to see Iraqis as 
humans victimized by an unjust war. As Dougherty13 stated: 
By acknowledging our experiences, it pressures people to 
recognize their own responsibility for the actions being 
taken by a military that is ultimately meant to defend 
them…We must remind people that the occupations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan are being waged by the United 
States as a country, not simply by our military or our 
political administration. By speaking out, we pressure our 
fellow Americans to acknowledge their own 
responsibility for these occupations, which is a necessary 
part in bringing them to an end. (IVAW and Glantz 2008: 
5). 
 Research exploring public sentiment against war has generally 
focused on weariness of war due to mounting casualties (Gartner 2008; 
Gartner and Segura 1998; Levy and Morgan 1986; Mueller 1973), 
mounting economic costs (Flores-Macias and Kreps 2012), and the 
influence of media (Christie 2006) and elites on public support for war 
(Berinsky 2007; Berinsky and Druckman 2007). However, little research 
exists on the strategies explicitly used to decrease public support for 
war—especially in terms of effective strategies to rehumanize groups 
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that have previously been dehumanized in initial efforts to generate 
public support for war. Notable exceptions include Motyl et. al’s (2012) 
work that demonstrates how the reframing of war and other similar forms 
of violence as animalistic reduces subjects’ support for war. Moreover, 
the work of Bonds (2009) suggests that role taking and the offering of 
empathic experiences of those victimized by war may be an effective 
strategy in reducing war lust and hatred of (or at least indifference 
toward) those “othered” by war.                                                                                                               
 However, while these soldiers and social movement activists 
have a high degree of legitimacy and the social credentials necessary to 
make anti-war narratives, we cannot conclusively state that IVAW’s 
rehumanization strategies led to an increase in empathic support of Iraqi 
citizens, nor to a decrease in public support for the war. The reason for 
this is speculative and worthy of future research regarding the limited 
success of anti-war and social movement activism. Nonetheless, in a 
track similar to that of Steuter and Wills (2008) and Bonds (2009), we 
argue that U.S. governmental, military and media elites took purposive 
action to limit Americans’ ability to hear stories of abuse by staging 
campaigns of favorable news coverage of the war (Barstow, 2008). 
Further, there is evidence to suggest that governmental and media 
officials also lead a counter movement to smear anti-war soldiers and 
limit their ability to issue statements of abuse against the U.S. military 
(Cammaerts and Carpentier 2009, Leitz 2011). Ultimately, further 
research is necessary to understand how members of the public made 
sense of the IVAW’s efforts to rehumanize Iraqi citizens. Additionally, 
social movement scholars need to explore the links between these anti-
war protest actions and media and governmental efforts to combat the 
coverage of U.S. war abuses. Research on this strategy of 
rehumanization (as well as oppositional counter efforts) may expand our 
understanding of the costs and benefits as well as successes and failures 
associated with a variety of social movement activism.   
        
 In the end, we do feel that the larger connection between 
rehumanizing narratives, public disapproval of war, and the decision of 
government officials to end or continue wars is a worthy endeavor of 
exploration. We hope that our examination of the tactics employed by 
IVAW encourages others to study strategies of rehumanization 
narratives. To reiterate, further research is needed on the effectiveness of 
rehumanization narratives on subjects’ approval of war, as well as a more 
general line of scholarship on strategies to reduce public support for war. 
 While our research design allowed us to specifically examine what 
strategies IVAW used to rehumanize Iraqis, research that tests the 
effectiveness of such strategies would be a valuable endeavor. 
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Postscript: The Future of IVAW Activism  
 On March 20, 2003, the United States invaded Iraq in order to 
depose its ruling regime. Eight years later the war officially ended on 
Dec. 15, 2011. With the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the official 
military involvement in Iraq ended, IVAW says it will now turn its 
attention to ensuring that vets are not forgotten as they try to reintegrate 
into civilian society. But this is not to say that IVAW will be politically 
inactive. As IVAW member Michael Hoffman states: 
 
Some of us are going to move on to completely different 
things. But we need to be there for the next generation of 
veterans, to help them and teach them the lessons we 
learned in opposing our war, but also be there for them 
so they don't fall apart (quoted in Fiedler, 2011). 
And finally from the IVAW website: 
We continue to strive for a world free of unjust war—a 
world without the political and economic conditions 
allowing militarism to exist, and without structural 
forces pushing our youth, our poor and those facing 
incarceration into the military; We strive for a society 
that prioritizes care for its warriors—where all who 
serve receive adequate benefits and the highest standard 
of compassionate care regardless of discharge status; We 
strive for a society that holds political leaders, profiteers, 
and war criminals accountable for the consequences of 
their actions; We strive for a political and military 
culture that embraces full human rights for service-
members, veterans and all people; We strive for a 
political culture that prioritizes nonviolence, open 
communication, and democratic decision-making over 
militarism—a culture committed to building peace and 
preserving life, solving international conflicts through 
diplomacy and alternative conflict resolution; We strive 
for a political culture that acknowledges our nation’s 
moral responsibilities to the people of Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and all civilians adversely affected by U.S. military 
intervention. The United States must fully accept 
guidance from these affected peoples and provide 
support they find valuable; Finally, we endeavor for our 
movement to be an ally to the oppressed—a community 
connected in solidarity with war torn peoples, working 
across differences for reconciliation, mutual healing and 
collective liberation (ivaw.org). 
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End Notes 
 
1 John Kerry is an American politician and current U.S. Secretary of 
State. He was a combat veteran who later became an anti-war advocate 
and outspoken member of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. He 
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was the presidential nominee for the Democratic Party in the 2004 
presidential elections. 
 
2 The number of times that the videos have been viewed on YouTube 
varies between a couple hundred times and over one million times. 
 
3 Michael Blake served in the Infantry Division of the U.S. Army. He 
was deployed to Iraq from April 2003 to March 2004. Following his 
return he filed for and received Conscientious Objector Status and an 
honorable discharge. 
 
4 Michael Prysner served in the United States Army Reserve as an Aerial 
Intelligence Specialist. He was deployed to Iraq from March 2003 to 
February 2004. He was 24 years old at the time of Winter Soldier 
(IVAW 2008: 98). 
 
5 Jody Casey served as a 19 Delta Cavalry Scout sniper in Iraq. 
 
6 Christopher Arendt served as a Specialist in the United States Army 
National Guard. He was deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and was 23 
years old at the time of Winter Soldier. 
 
7 Kristopher Goldsmith was a Sergeant in the United States Army and 
served as a Forward Observer. He was deployed to Sadr City from 
January to December 2005. He was discharged from the military after 
attempting to commit suicide to avoid further deployment. He was 27 
years old at the time of Winter Soldier (IVAW 2008: 185). 
 
8 Ryan Endicott served in the United States Marine Corps in Iraq and 
Southeast Asia at the rank of Corporal (IVAW 2009). 
 
9 Jon Turner was a Lance Corporal in the United States Marines and 
served as an automatic machine gunner. In 2006 he was deployed to 
Fallujah, Abu Ghraib, and Ramadi. He was 22 years old at the time of 
Winter Solider (IVAW 2008:23). 
 
10 Andrew Duffy served as a Sergeant in the Iowa Army National Guard. 
He was deployed to Abu Ghraib from October 2005 to October 2006 and 
worked as a medic. 
 
11 Jason Hurd served as a Specialist in the Medic Troop of the Tennessee 
National Guard. He was deployed to Central Baghdad from November 
2004 to November 2005. He was 28 years old at the time of Winter 
Soldier (IVAW 2008: 38). 
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12 Scott Ewing held the rank of Specialist while serving in the United 
States Army as a Calvary Scout. He was deployed to Tal Afar from 
March 2005 to March 2006 (IVAW 2008: 70). 
 
13 Kelly Dougherty originally served in the military police unit of the 
Colorado National Guard and was deployed to Iraq from March 2003 
until February 2004 as a medic. 
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